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This article attempts to quantify the decline of Spain over the period
1500–1850. In contrast to earlier estimates that focus almost exclusively on
Castilian agriculture, we look at trends in urbanisation and construct new
measures of agricultural and aggregate output at both regional and
national levels. A distinctive long-run behaviour is found across Spanish
regions that rejects the identification between Castile and Spain. Per capita
income grew in the sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries, while
contraction and stagnation occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. In the long run, output per head did not improve until the early
nineteenth century. At the time of its imperial expansion Spain was a
relatively affluent nation and, by 1590, was only behind the Low Countries
and Italy in terms of per capita income. Spain’s decline has its roots in the
seventeenth century while its backwardness deepened in the first half of
the nineteenth century.
Spain’s macroeconomic performance from the conquest of Granada (1492)
to the beginning of modern economic growth in the 1850s remains unclear.
Although decline and backwardness are stressed by historians, no consensus
exists about when Spain fell behind. While early modern historians place it
between the late sixteenth and mid seventeenth centuries (Hamilton 1938,
Elliot 1961, Thompson and Yun 1994), modern economic historians locate
it in the early nineteenth century when a painful definition and enforcement
of new liberal property rights took place (Prados de la Escosura 1988).
In spite of a hot and long-lasting debate on the historical decline of
Spain (Hamilton 1938, Elliott 1961, Kamen 1978, 1981, Israel 1981), it
was considered in isolation and no attempts were made at quantifying its
1 We follow Paul David’s (1967, p. 157) definition of ‘conjectural estimates’ as ‘figures which
are in the nature of predictions’ in contrast with direct historical estimates that can afford
internal consistency checks.
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economic performance.2 Recently hypothetical exercises have been carried
out with different outcomes: from a sustained decline to a moderate increase
in GDP per head. Attempts to compare Spain with other European countries
also cast contradictory results. Significant puzzles emerge from the debate.
How was it plausible, for example, that if Spain were one of the poorest
and dwindling countries in Europe, as suggested by van Zanden (2005a), it
could have succeeded in maintaining a permanent state of war with much
wealthier rivals for almost three centuries?3 Actually, van Zanden’s (2005a)
guesstimates match Kamen’s (1978, p. 41) earlier appraisal of imperial Spain:
‘a backward country with poor resources, dependent on external markets and
external suppliers’.4
Moreover, assessments of Spain’s long-term economic performance rely
on incomplete attempts to derive product per head in the Kingdom of Castile
(Figure 1) largely on the basis of agricultural indicators. Regions outside
Castile, especially those coastal areas that became very active over time, are
left aside.
This article investigates when the decline of Spain began and examines
the evidence on economic performance over more than three hundred years.
We start by examining the available estimates and conjectures on Spain’s
real product and the consistency of their underlying assumptions. We find
that widening the focus to include regions other than Castile as well as
economic activity outside agriculture is necessary and, as a first step, we
look at urbanisation levels and trends. We then carry out a new estimate of
GDP on a regional basis. Specifically, we estimate movements in agricultural
consumption and output using a demand function approach, while we proxy
output trends in industry and services through changes in urban population
(adjusted to exclude those living on agriculture), so tendencies in total output
and output per head can be established at regional and national level. Finally,
Spain’s position within western Europe is re-examined.
Our favoured results show a long-term productivity decline in agriculture,
only partially reversed in the seventeenth century and, again, in the early
nineteenth century. Urbanisation rates, adjusted to exclude population living
2 Elliott (1961, pp. 55–6) proposed in vain ‘to compare Spanish conditions with those of
other contemporary societies, and then, if it is possible to isolate any features which appear
unique to Spain, to search for their origins not only in the realm of national character, but
also in the conditions of the soil and the nature of land-holding, and in the country’s social
and geographical structure’.
3 Elliott (1961, p. 63) pointed out the similarities between Spain and eastern Europe, Poland
in particular, which were all exporters of primary produce and importers of manufactures,
and with high income inequality.
4 According to Kamen (1978, p. 49) Spain was ‘an underdeveloped country which never
reaped the benefits of its imperial position’. Cipolla (1980, p. 250) shares this perception:
‘The decline of Spain in the seventeenth century is not difficult to understand. The
fundamental fact is that Spain never developed to begin with.’
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Figure 1. Early modern Spain
off agriculture, rose significantly in the sixteenth century and again in
the eighteenth century (especially after 1750), while they fell sharply in
the seventeenth century. Overall, the adjusted rate of urbanisation almost
doubled between the early sixteenth and the late eighteenth century and,
by 1850, was nearly two and a half times higher than in 1500. In aggregate
terms, we can conjecture that per capita income hardly changed between
1500 and 1800, while it increased slightly if the time span is extended up to
1850. Our results highlight the disparity in regional performance, especially
between inland and coastal regions. When we look at specific periods we find
that real GDP per head grew moderately in the sixteenth century (0.1 per
cent), declined between the late sixteenth century and 1700 (at −0.1 per
cent), practically stagnated during the eighteenth century, and rose in the
early nineteenth century (at 0.3 per cent annually).
In a comparative perspective, our findings support the view that when
Spain colonised America and built a worldwide empire it was not a poor
country of warriors but a relatively affluent nation and, by the end of the
sixteenth century, when it had achieved ‘the political hegemony of Europe’
(Hamilton 1938, p. 168), Spanish per capita income was among the highest
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in Europe, second only to Italy and the Low Countries. Since the 1590s
Spain experienced an absolute decline that only became relative in the
early nineteenth century. Spain’s decline has its roots in the seventeenth
century while its backwardness deepened in the first half of the nineteenth
century.
1. Available conjectures on Spain’s economic performance
The available conjectural estimates about long-run economic performance in
early modern Spain are summarised in Table 1. Their variance is large as
they range from a decline to a rise in per capita income over the period
1500–1800, with Maddison (2003) and van Zanden (2005b) providing the
extreme optimistic and pessimistic (+42 and −17.5 per cent change) views,
respectively.5 A closer look reveals contradictory assessments of the sixteenth
century, from a substantial rise (Maddison) to a sharp fall (Carreras), while
no consensus appears on the seventeenth century, usually considered the
locus of Spanish decadence, and discrepancies emerge, once again, in the
eighteenth-century performance. Only Maddison’s estimates cover up to
1850 and suggest a mild increase in per capita GDP.6
The contrast between Spain and the two leading early modern economies,
Britain and the Netherlands, exposes a long-run decline (Table 2). From
near parity in 1500, Spanish per capita income fell to represent half that
of Britain in the early nineteenth century.7 With respect to the ‘average’
European income, guesstimates range from relative stability to a significant
backwardness over the period 1500–1800. Maddison (2003), in particular,
points to Spain catching up in the sixteenth century, declining during the
seventeenth century and, after the eighteenth-century stability, falling behind
in the early nineteenth century.
It is worth noting that Maddison and van Zanden based their estimates
on previous attempts at quantifying early modern Spanish economic
5 Computed as the natural logarithm of the ratio between the corresponding values for the
final (1800 or 1820) and the initial (1500) dates.
6 For 1820–50, Maddison (2003) uses a figure derived from a previous study (Maddison
1995) in which he assumed that real per capita GDP growth between 1820 and 1850
matched that computed for 1832–60 by Prados de la Escosura (1982b, p. 110). However,
according to Maddison (2003, p. 66), the implicit yearly growth rate is 0.23 per cent while
for Prados de la Escosura (1982b, p. 69) it is 0.34 per cent. Later, Prados de la Escosura
(1988) reckoned that real GDP per head increased at an annual rate of 0.14 per cent
between 1800 and 1860.
7 Alternative estimates of Spanish per capita GDP relative to the United Kingdom in 1850
suggest a higher figure, that goes up to 64 and 68 per cent, in purchasing power parity
terms, in Prados de la Escosura’s (2000) and Bairoch’s (1976) computations, respectively,
while it is only 43 per cent in nominal terms (that is, when the conversion is made with the
trading exchange rate) (see Prados de la Escosura 2000).
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Table 1. Real per capita GDP in Spain (1600= 100): alternative quesstimates
Yun-Casalilla∗ van Zanden (2005a)∗∗
(a) (b) Carreras Maddison van Zanden (2005b) lower bound upper bound
1500 134.6 77.5 106.4
1600 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1630∗∗∗ 78.4 71.8 90.7 100.0
1700 108.8 100.0 97.0 90.7 91.7
1750 84.8 108.8 85.4 93.0
1800 97.4 118.2 150.4 89.3
1820 118.2 100.0 111.6
1850 126.5
Sources: Yun-Casalilla (1994), Carreras (2003), Maddison (2003) and van Zanden (2005a, 2005b).
Notes:
∗Yun Casalilla, 1590= 100. (a) converted into grams of silver and deflated with Reher and Ballesteros (1993) consumer price index (in grams of
silver); (b) deflated with a composite consumer price index for 8 goods from Hamilton (1934) with weights from Vela and Marcos (1978).
∗∗van Zanden (2005a), 1570= 100.
∗∗∗The figure for 1630 corresponds to 1650 in van Zanden (2005a).
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Table 2. Relative real per capita GDP in Spain
van Zanden (2005a) van Zanden (2005b) Maddison
% UK
1500 105.8 98.0 92.6
1570 103.4
1600 92.3 87.6
1650 80.6
1700 60.1 68.8 68.2
1750 48.2
1800 41.7
1820 48.0 59.1
1850 46.3
% Netherlands
1500 78.4 64.5 86.9
1570 78.4
1600 55.5 61.8
1650 45.8
1700 44.1 46.4 40.0
1750 43.1
1800 42.9
1820 52.2 54.8
1850 45.5
% Europe∗
1500 84.3 95.4 85.7
1570 84.3
1600 89.8 95.9
1650 79.1
1700 74.1 81.6 85.5
1750 72.3
1800 75.3
1820 82.8 83.7
1850 55.1
Sources: van Zanden (2005a, 2005b) and Maddison (2003).
Notes: van Zanden (2005a), average of the upper and lower bound estimates van Zanden
(2005b), refers to England in the upper panel.
∗ weighted average of European countries in each author’s sample. In the case of Maddison
(2003), western Europe.
performance. In his most recent study, van Zanden (2005a) follows Albert
Carreras (2003), who, in turn, relied on contributions by Garcı´a Sanz
(1991b) and Yun-Casalilla (1994), while Maddison (2003) also drew on Yun’s
estimates. Moreover, van Zanden (2005b) regressed his own (and largely
conjectural) per capita GDP estimates (van Zanden 2001) on the labour
share in agriculture and real wage rates for a sample of countries. He then
multiplied the parameters obtained in the regression for each independent
variable by their corresponding values in every country, and their results
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were added up in order to derive per capita income for European countries
at benchmark years for which figures were not available.
Hence, in order to assess the available guesses about early modern growth
in Spain we must begin by examining how these computations were made by
Yun-Casalilla (1994) and Carreras (2003), and test their consistency against
the available evidence.
Carreras followed an eclectic approach in which he derived GDP
guesstimates on the basis of Garcı´a Sanz’s (1991b) bold conjectures about
Castilian fiscal pressure (that is, tax revenue expressed as a proportion of
GDP) and combined them with Yun’s GDP estimates from the expenditure
side for the Kingdom of Castile.8 Thus, Carreras, by (implicitly) identifying
Spain with Castile, obtained Spain’s nominal GDP as the result of dividing
tax revenues – excluding revenue from America – by Garcı´a Sanz’s
guesstimates of fiscal pressure, and used the available population data to
derive GDP per head.9 GDP estimates based upon hypotheses on the level
of fiscal pressure are, therefore, far from accurate and should be treated with
extreme caution.10
Yun-Casalilla (1994) based his computation of private consumption for
late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Castile (c. 1590 and c. 1630)
on different estimates of rural families’ expenditure to which he added public
spending in order to reach total consumption, as an approximation to GDP.11
For 1750, he revised upwards the Cadastre de Ensenada (a fiscal survey
carried out in the Kingdom of Castile during the 1750s) figures for 1752,
while his estimates for the last decade of the eighteenth century are derived
from the various contemporary sources.
8 Garcı´a Sanz (1991b) reckoned that, by the mid eighteenth century, the rentas provinciales
(that is, taxes paid in the Kingdom of Castile that mainly fell on consumption goods:
alcabalas, cientos, millones, etc.) represented between 4.0 and 6.5 per cent of the Kingdom
of Castile’s national income. He went on to suggest that if, around the mid eighteenth
century, these main taxes provided the Treasury with 25 per cent less revenue than in
1600, while the population had increased by 15 per cent, ‘it would be reasonable to
estimate that tax revenues in 1600 represented around 10 percent of Castile’s “national”
income’. He added that fiscal pressure could have reached 5 per cent of GDP around 1500,
and up to 15 per cent in the first half of the seventeenth century.
9 However, as different fiscal authorities existed in Spain, any estimate of aggregate taxation
would require information regarding the Kingdom of Aragon (that is, Aragon, Valencia,
Catalonia, Balearic Islands) and the Kingdom of Navarre, in addition to that on the
Kingdom of Castile (the dominant but declining part, that includes the rest of Spain) (see
Figure 1). The Decretos (decrees) de Nueva Planta represented the institutional and fiscal
unification of the Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon in the early eighteenth century that led
to the introduction of new taxes in Aragon.
10 Moreover, the data on taxation capture better, perhaps, the economic situation of the
monarchy than that of the Spanish economy.
11 He appears to have neglected investment (at least, private capital formation, as public
investment could be included under the public spending estimates) in his GDP estimates.
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How reliable are these figures? One way of putting available GDP per head
estimates and guesses to the test is to compute a lower bound for per capita
income, biasing downwards the estimates in order to show that even in such
a case, our control estimates tend to be higher. To do so, we have used the
following equation:
y = w L/N d/L s−1 (1)
where y represents per capita income; w, the daily wage rate; L, the
economically active population; N, total population; d/L, the number of
working days per occupied person each year; and s, the share of labour in
national income (Malanima 2006).12
Feliu (1991) provides information on unskilled wages (those of
journeymen or day labourers (jornaleros) and farm workers (peones)),
expressed in grams of silver, for Catalonia, along with similar data for Old
and New Castile, Andalusia and Valencia originally from Hamilton (1934).
We chose unskilled wages on purpose to get a lower bound estimate of
income per head, and to derive w we weighted the available evidence on
unskilled wages for the Kingdoms of Castile (taken from Old and New
Castile and Andalusia) and Aragon (obtained from Catalonia and Valencia)
by their shares in Spain’s population (roughly three-fourths and one-fourth,
respectively).13
Then, the proportion of the total population represented by the
economically active population, L/N, was needed. A figure of 30.5 per cent
was estimated from the Cadastre de Ensenada (1752) for the Kingdom of
Castile by Grupo ’75 (1977). Such a low figure results from the practice of
excluding the female population from the economically active population
(EAP) in the eighteenth-century censuses.14 This is an extreme assumption
but, since our goal is to obtain a lower bound estimate for per capita income,
we decided to accept it.
12 It can be easily shown that this equation can be transformed into y = w L/N d/L
s−1 = (w d)/(N s); from which s can be obtained: s = (w d)/(N y).
13 It is worth noting that money wages were often just a part of the returns from unskilled
labour (Lo´pez-Salazar 1986). Available evidence on the working poor for the 1840s
suggests that a large gap existed between their expenditure and their income (Garcı´a Sanz
1981). As individuals tend to conceal their income due to taxation, expenditure seems a
better approximation to the concept of permanent income and has become a preferred
measure of the standard of living. Such a gap between income and expenditure is a
recurrent phenomenon in present-day studies carried out on the basis of microdata
obtained from household surveys (Milanovic 2005, pp. 16–17). For present-day Spain, see
Goerlich and Mas (2001, p. 364).
14 An even lower figure, 26.4 per cent, results from Floridablanca’s 1787 population census.
These figures are lower than those for the mid nineteenth century: 35.8 per cent in the
1850s and 36.5 per cent as an average over the period 1850–1913. In nineteenth-century
estimates female agricultural labour has been excluded due to statistical errors. (See
Prados de la Escosura 2003.)
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The next step was to establish the number of days worked (d). Bairoch
(1965, 1989) accepted 196–7 days for nineteenth-century Europe, and Allen
(2001) opted for a higher figure, 250 working days, for early modern Europe.
However, in the Cadastre de Ensenada it was assumed that farmers worked
120 days per year, artisans, 180, and servants, 250 (Ringrose 1983).15 We
chose 180 days as a lower bound.
Finally, we need to know the share of labour in national income (s). The
labour share in national income is usually assumed to range between 0.5
and 0.6 (Crafts 1995, Crafts and Harley 1992). In our view, this probably
represents an underestimate for early modern Spain where the endowment
of capital was low.16 We adopted the closest available estimate for Spain,
that for the 1850s, 0.75 (Prados de la Escosura and Rose´s 2007). Since it
is our purpose to obtain a lower bound estimate, this value for s seems
adequate.
Our estimates represent, therefore, a lower bound estimate because of the
astringent assumptions introduced in the calculation (the use of unskilled
wages only, a low rate of activity, and a low number of days per worker and
year). If, instead, we were to accept a higher number of working days, 250,
the one allocated to services in the Cadastre de Ensenada, a participation
rate of 55 per cent, as in late eighteenth-century England (Voth 1998, 2001),
and a labour share of 0.6, as usually assumed in the literature, we would
reach a higher estimate, that could be increased further by using a weighted
average of skilled and unskilled wages rather than just unskilled wages.
In order to facilitate the comparison between per capita income estimates
resulting from our arithmetical exercise and the available estimates of GDP
per head, all of them were converted into grams of silver.17
The conjectural estimates on GDP per head and our (lower and upper
bound) control estimates are provided in Table 3. It clearly appears that
Carreras’s (2003) and Yun-Casalilla’s (1994) figures, and those that can be
15 See also Vilar (1970, p. 129) and Santolaya Heredero (1991). The figure for days worked
in agriculture is confirmed by Simpson (1992) for late nineteenth-century Andalusia,
where labour input requirements implied that agricultural workers were employed for
fewer than 120 days per year.
16 Antra´s and Voth (2003, p. 66) considered 0.6–0.7 an upper bound for Britain during the
Industrial Revolution.
17 The reason for converting nominal figures into grams of silver derives from the
depreciation of the real de vello´n from the early seventeenth century onwards. The large
amount of vello´n coinage (fiat money made of copper) in the seventeenth century was
rejected by the public, instead of contributing to facilitate minor transactions (Motomura
1997, Sargent and Velde 2002). It is not possible to know what proportion of tax revenues
were in silver and what proportion in vello´n. Consequently, as we had to assume that all
tax revenues were in vello´n, GDP estimates based on fiscal pressure may be downward
biased from the seventeenth century onwards.
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Table 3. Conjectural estimates of per capita GDP at current prices
(grams of silver)
Control estimates
Garcı´a Sanz Yun-Casalilla Carreras Lower bound Upper bound
1500 148 160 226 708
c. 1560 339 289 904
c. 1590 499 645 521 665 2082
c. 1630 644 677 748 2343
c. 1650 521 606 1897
1700 510 605 1894
1750 370 462 366 1147
c. 1800 919 959 630 1974
Sources: Garcı´a Sanz (1991), Yun Casalilla (1994), Carreras (2003), Felı´u (1991) and text.
Control estimates: lower bound, assuming 180 days of work, 0.305 activity rate and 0.75
labour share; upper bound, assuming 250 days of work, 0.55 activity rate and 0.6 labour
share.
derived on the basis of Garcı´a Sanz’s (1991b) conjectures on fiscal pressure,
tend to be on the low side.
Why are these GDP guesstimates on the low side? Our proposed
explanation is that they suffer from two main biases. The first one is that
they only take one part of Spain into account: the Kingdom of Castile and,
often, only Old and New Castile. Other regions, especially those on the
Mediterranean periphery, amounting to approximately 30 per cent of Spain’s
territory, are left aside.
A way of assessing the extent to which focusing exclusively on Castile
introduces a downward bias in Spain’s GDP estimates is to look at regional
population trends. The scant information available indicates substantial
differences in population growth across regions (Table 4).18 The more
vigorous demographic performance in the Kingdom of Castile during the
sixteenth century is clear, with New Castile and Galicia, where the rate
of growth exceeded 1 per cent per year, standing out. The Kingdom of
Aragon took over in the seventeenth century, with moderate growth, while
the population of the Kingdom of Castile fell, despite the increases recorded
in some regions (Basque, Murcia and Andalusia). In the eighteenth century,
only Murcia and Asturias (and, to a lesser extent, Galicia) were able to match
Catalonia and Valencia’s demographic dynamism. Early nineteenth-century
demographic acceleration was led by the peripheral regions with the pace
of Catalan growth doubling that of Castile. In short, the uneven regional
expansion since the sixteenth century changed the geographical distribution
of Spain’s population and, consequently, pushed economic activity (with the
18 The dispersion of regional population growth rates (as measured by the coefficient of
variation) rose from 0.5 between 1530 and 1591 to 2.2 in the seventeenth century, before
falling to 0.6 and 0.3 in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, respectively.
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Table 4. Regional population growth (annual rates %)
1530–91 1591–1700 1700–87 1787–1857 1530–1787 1530–1857
Andalusia 0.55 0.28 0.28 0.66 0.34 0.41
Aragon 0.32 0.50 0.18 0.49 0.35 0.38
Asturias 0.81 0.08 1.01 0.59 0.57 0.57
Balearic Islands 0.53 0.20 0.20 0.57 0.28 0.34
Basque 0.25 0.52 0.03 0.42 0.29 0.32
Canary Islands 0.48
Catalonia 0.61 0.32 0.64 0.87 0.50 0.58
Extremadura 0.64 −0.17 0.13 0.75 0.12 0.26
Galicia 1.07 0.44 0.58 0.40 0.64 0.58
Murcia 0.71 0.46 0.68 0.41 0.60 0.56
Navarre 0.06 0.52 0.03 0.39 0.24 0.27
New Castile 1.02 −0.21 0.26 0.39 0.24 0.27
Old Castile &
Leon
0.32 −0.27 0.32 0.41 0.07 0.14
Valencia 0.45 0.19 0.66 0.66 0.41 0.46
Spain 0.58 0.09 0.39 0.54 0.31 0.36
Note: Regional data adjusted to match the revised consensus national figures. See Table 5.
Sources: 1530 and 1591, Nadal (1984), completed with Fortea (1995) and Ruiz Martı´n
(1967) (with four people per household instead of five); 1700, Grupo ’75 (1977) and Bustelo
(1972a); 1787, Nadal (1984) and Nicolau (2005); 1857, Nicolau (2005) and Artola (1973).
exception of Madrid) towards the coastal areas. Regional discrepancies in
population growth could signal very different paths of economic progress as
demographic expansion often leads to widening the market and increasing
specialisation (Reis 2005, p. 198). Alas, such different regional demographic
performance is neither captured by current assessments of early modern
Spain’s economic performance nor by trends in real wages that offer roughly
the same declining pattern across regions (Figure 2).
A non-negligible caveat to be made is that the population figures assigned
to Spain in international comparisons (de Vries 1984, Bairoch, Batou and
Che`vre 1988, Allen 2000) present large discrepancies with those currently
used by Spanish historical demographers. Population figures by Bairoch
and his associates are significantly higher than those generally accepted by
Spain’s historians (Table 5).19 The resulting trends in population growth
are also discrepant as illustrated, for the sixteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, by the contrast between the brisk population expansion offered by
the ‘consensus’ estimates and the sluggish pace by Bairoch’s figures.
The second bias derives from the almost exclusive concentration on
agriculture.20 It is true that there is little documentary evidence on trade,
19 It should be noted that de Vries (1984) also tends to overestimate the population: by more
than 40 per cent for 1500 and around 20 per cent for 1600.
20 For example, computing expenditure on the basis of peasant family consumption, as
Yun-Casalilla (1994) does, implies assuming that no difference existed between urban and
rural consumption levels.
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Figure 2. Regional trends in real wages, 1500–1860 (1530= 100)
Sources: New Castile, Reher and Ballesteros (1993); Catalonia, Felı´u (2004);
Valencia and Madrid, Allen (2001, background data set).
Table 5. Spain’s population: alternative estimates (million)
[I] [II] [III]
Consensus estimates Bairoch [I/II]
1530 4.8 7.5 0.64
1591 6.8 8.7 0.78
1700 7.5 8.6 0.87
1750 9.3 9.6 0.97
1787 11.0 13.0 0.85
1857 15.5 15.5 1.00
Sources: Bairoch et al. (1988); consensus estimates, 1500–1700, Carreras (2003);
1750–1800, Bustelo (1972a,1972b); 1850, Nicolau (2005).
industrial production in rural areas and services, but the lack of data does
not justify its neglect.21 In fact, although a significant part of the Spanish
economically active population worked in services (Lo´pez-Salazar 1986,
21 The fact that, in the late sixteenth century, real wages in Spain were among the highest in
Europe (Allen 2001) also suggests that activities outside agriculture must be taken into
account.
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Alvar Ezquerra 1989, Reher 1990, Yun-Casalilla 2004), this sector has been
neglected in GDP guesstimates. If the arrival of American silver caused a
‘Dutch disease’ in Spain (Forsyth and Nicholas 1983, Drelichman 2005), it
should be reflected in an increase in non-tradable goods’ production, that
is, mainly in construction and services.22 Neither sector, however, has been
taken into consideration in the available estimates.
An active transport sector, for example, had to develop if large quantities
of foreign goods were imported into Spain, given the nature of the country’s
geography and particularly that of Castile whose cities were located several
hundred kilometres away from the coast.23 Evidence for Old Castilian and
Andalusian villages indicates that a non-negligible part of the economically
active population was employed in transportation (Herr 1989, Bernardos
Sanz 2003). Transport activities must have had an impact on urban centres,
not only as a means by which they received their supplies, as in the case
of the capital city, Madrid, but because of the development of highly active
trade networks that required transportation services.24
To sum up, a more comprehensive view of early modern Spain’s economic
performance requires widening the focus to include regions other than
Castile and economic activity outside agriculture. Looking at the pace of
urbanisation is one way to do it, as it was in towns and cities where most,
though not all, the industrial and service sectors’ activity took place.
22 The arrival of American silver provides a case in point. There is almost complete
agreement among historians about the impact of New World precious metal. In Europe,
American silver reduced transaction costs and encouraged trade, leading to an increase in
output. Both rural and urban industrial growth received a stimulus. It also strengthened
the trade link between Europe and Asia, diversifying consumption and opening new
markets to an active group of traders (Hamilton 1934). Spain, however, would be the only
country negatively affected by American silver, which pushed up nominal wages, made
agricultural products more expensive, encouraged the consumption of luxury goods and
acted as a disincentive to work.
23 A high transport activity must have remained until, at least, the mid seventeenth century,
as the amount of American specie arriving in Spain, the main source used to pay for the
imports, grew until 1620. The scarcity of transport is, nonetheless, one of the elements
most frequently put forward to explain Spain’s economic backwardness (Ringrose 1970).
24 Such networks distributed and traded the foreign goods consumed in Spain that were
paid for, not only with silver, but also with wool, high-quality cloth or raw materials. One
of the most active trade centres was the area of Bilbao and Navarre which linked the
French border and the ports along this part of Spain’s north coast with the central plateau
(Priotti 2005). While, during the sixteenth century, smuggled goods from France passed
through Bilbao or Navarre on their way to Valladolid, Burgos and Medina del Campo, in
the following century the destination of such goods was mainly Madrid. Merchants from
Soria went to the capital to stock up on these imported goods. Madrid’s importance lay
not only in it being a centre of consumption but also in its role as a hub of redistribution
for all types of merchandise to the rest of the peninsula. Trading activity, in addition to
that linked with America via the Carrera de Indias, also took place in the south.
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2. Urbanisation: a glance at long-run performance outside
agriculture
By comparing figures for urban dwellers with those for the total population
we can trace urbanisation trends through the early modern age. But how can
we define ‘urban’ population? To remain consistent with Bairoch, Batou and
Che`vre (1988), we define ‘urban’ population as dwellers of towns of 5,000
inhabitants or more. Such a definition is arbitrary and other authors prefer
a threshold of 10,000 (de Vries 1984) or 20,000 (Flora 1981) inhabitants.25
However, maintaining a constant threshold over time, while population
grows, is questionable (Wrigley 1985).
It is clear that the higher the threshold to be deemed an urban centre,
the lower the probability of including people employed in the agricultural
sector.26 In the case of Spain, it has been argued, urbanisation rates are over-
exaggerated due to the existence of ‘agro-towns’, especially in central and
southern Spain. ‘Agro-towns’, a legacy of highly concentrated landownership
that led to a large proportion of landless agricultural workers, were mainly
located in Andalusia, Murcia and the south of Valencia (Casado 2001, Reher
1990).
Unfortunately, it is far from easy to exclude that part of the population
totally or partially employed in agriculture from the urban population for the
early modern age. Likewise, it is difficult to leave out the rural population
totally or partially occupied in industry or services as the diversification of
labour activities was a widespread phenomenon (Federico 1986, Domı´nguez
1994). In Spain, a non-negligible share of the rural population worked in
manufacturing and in the provision of services during the slack season in
agriculture (Herr 1989, Lo´pez-Salazar 1986). It is also true that farmers
and rural labourers could be found among the urban population and,
consequently, the income of the rural population did not derive exclusively
from agriculture, nor did that of the urban population come only from
industry and services. Thus, alongside the existence of ‘agro-towns’, we
should keep in mind non-agricultural activities carried out by the rural
population (storage, transportation, domestic service, construction, light
manufacturing).27 Perhaps, then, rather than assigning each worker to a
single occupation, a more rigorous option would be to measure employment
25 Bairoch, Batou and Che`vre (1988) employ alternatively 2,000, 5,000, 10,000 and 20,000
inhabitants.
26 In order to mitigate the inclusion of ‘agro-towns’, in which most of the population is
employed in agriculture, Malanima (1998), for example, proposes a lower limit for being
considered urban: 5,000 inhabitants for the north and centre of Italy, and 10,000 for the
south of the country.
27 Wool provides a case in point in early modern Spain. A mainly rural activity, it had both
industrial and services (trade, transport, financial services) dimensions (Garcı´a Sanz
1986).
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composition by sector in terms of days or hours (Wrigley 1985).28 It is more
important, however, from the point of view of economic growth to emphasise
that the reduction in transaction costs and the specialisation associated with
a more intense use of the market in urban centres does not conflict with the
kind of economic activity performed by those living in towns (in other words,
urban dwellers, regardless of their occupation, benefited from the use of the
market more than those living in the countryside).
Different attempts to discriminate between agricultural and non-
agricultural employment in towns have been carried out for early modern
Spain. Reher (1990) reckoned that, in 1787, half the economically active
population living in towns in Spain worked in agriculture. Reher’s
computations are on the high side as he increased artificially the share of
urban population employed in agriculture by allocating all day labourers
to this sector while excluding servants from the labour force. Recently,
Llopis Agela´n and Gonza´lez Mariscal (2006) introduced a more astringent
definition of urban population: in order to qualify as ‘urban’, a population
centre needs to have (a) more than 5,000 (alternatively, they also used
10,000) inhabitants and (b) less than half of its economically active
population (EAP) occupied in agriculture. This way they estimated, also
for 1787, that the conventional rate of urbanisation (23.7 per cent, according
to their own computations) should be cut down by almost half (12.7 per
cent).29
Notwithstanding the existence of ‘agro-towns’, a large proportion of urban
economic activity was associated with industry and services. From data on
the six major cities in sixteenth-century Old Castile, Yun-Casalilla (2004)
reckons that agricultural employment represented, on average, 8 per cent
of the total labour force. For the late eighteenth century, Pe´rez Moreda
and Reher (2003, p. 129) observe that most urban day labourers were
employed outside agriculture and, according to their estimates from the
1787 population census, farmers (labradores) only represented 7.6 per cent
of the urban population in Spain.
In our case, we accepted the 5,000 inhabitant conventional threshold
to define an urban centre, but qualified it by previously adjusting the
urban population downwards to exclude those living on agriculture. In
order to distinguish the shares of those employed in agricultural and in
non-agricultural activities for both the total urban and rural population
we have carried out an arithmetical exercise along the lines suggested by
Wrigley (1985) and more recently Allen (2000) that, nonetheless, introduces
some departures from the original approach. Wrigley assumed that all the
28 The number of days (and hours) worked per EAP in Spain was lower in agriculture than
in industry and services, leaving extra time to work in non-agricultural activities. Cf.
Santolaya Heredero (1991), Vilar (1970, p. 19) and Ringrose (1983).
29 14.5 per cent if we accept a less stringent definition of urban population.
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agricultural population lives in rural areas, so the crucial distinction to make
is between the agricultural and non-agricultural shares of rural population.30
However, since the existence of ‘agro-towns’ is accepted in the case of Spain,
our challenge has been to establish the share of population employed in
agriculture in both the rural and the urban populations.
In order to do so, we could start by comparing the share of the
economically active population (L) occupied in agriculture (Lagr/L) with
the share of total population (N) living in rural areas (Nrur/N). If the ratio
between the two shares [(Lagr/L):(Nrur/N)] is above one, it can be claimed
that part of the population living in towns worked in agriculture. Conversely,
a ratio below one suggests that part of those living in the countryside
worked for industry and services. This way we could distribute rural and
urban population into agricultural and non-agricultural. However, a further
adjustment is required to allow for urban–rural differences in the proportion
of total population (N) of working age, or potentially active population
(PAP), and in the share of the working-age population (PAP) which was
economically active (L). This way, a more accurate test can be performed
by comparing the agricultural and the rural economically active populations
(Lagr /Lrur).
Fortunately, we have information on the PAP/N ratio in both rural and
urban areas by region for 1787 (Marcos Martı´n 2005). This ratio (computed –
due to data restrictions in the early modern population censuses – as
population aged 16 to 50 over total population) differs for each region (i)
between urban (PAP/N)urb i1787 and rural (PAP/N)rur i1787 areas, being larger
in the former, but with a low dispersion in both cases.31 The implication
is that using rural and urban population without a previous adjustment
for age composition would bias our results against agricultural employment
as, on average, the rural PAP/N ratio is 87.5 per cent of the urban one.
Unfortunately, there are no data on the PAP/N ratio over time except for
New Castile, for which it was computed by Reher (1991, pp. 70–4) from
the late sixteenth century onwards. Thus, we were forced to approximate
long-run changes in Spain by those in New Castile (NC) (PAP/N)NCt.32 We
derived the urban and rural working-age population for every region i at each
30 Allen (2000) accepts the difficulties involved in estimating the number of urban farmers,
but claims that ‘their number was small as is the error from assuming it was zero’.
31 They were, on average, 55.7 and 48.8 per cent in urban and rural areas, respectively. The
urban and rural coefficients of variation are 0.056 and 0.023, respectively, and are
computed from Marcos Martı´n (2005). The regional dispersion in the activity rate
(EAP/PAP) is also low, 0.113.
32 Regional dispersion was low for PAP/N in 1787 but we do not really know if this was the
case in previous epochs. In New Castile, the PAP/N ratio, computed for the share of
population between 15 and 50 years old, was rather stable over time with less than a 5
percentage variation around the 1787 ratio (Reher 1991, pp. 70–4).
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benchmark year t (= 1530, 1591, 1700, 1750, 1787, 1857) as follows:33
PAP ′urb it = Nurb it(PAP/N)urb i1787((PAP/N)NCt/(PAP/N)NC1787) (2)
PAP ′rur it = Nrur it(PAP/N)rur i1787((PAP/N)NCt/(PAP/N)NC1787) (3)
Then, in order to arrive at regional figures for economically active urban
(Lurb it) and rural (Lrur it) populations at each benchmark we needed to derive
the relevant L/PAP ratios. Alas, we were only able to compute the L/PAP ratio
for 1787 without being able to distinguish between urban and rural ratios.
Thus, we were forced to estimate regional figures of urban and rural EAP
for every region and benchmark year as
L′urb it = PAP ′urb i t (L/PAP)i1787 (4)
L′rur it = PAP ′rur i t (L/PAP)i1787 (5)
Next, we compared the economically active population occupied in
agriculture (Lagr) with that living in rural areas (L′rur). If Lagr > L′rur it
can be presumed that part of the population living in towns worked in
agriculture. Conversely, if Lagr < L′rur the implication is that those living
in the countryside allocated part of their working time to industry and
services. This way, we distributed the rural (L′rur) and urban (L′urb)
economically active populations into agricultural (agr) and non-agricultural
(nonagr) occupations and reached a figure for urban non-agricultural labour
(L′urb-nonagr it).
L′rur-nonagr it = L′rur it − Lagr it if L′rur i t > Lagr it, zero otherwise (6)
L′rur-agr it = L′rur it − L′rur-nonagr it (7)
L′urb-agr it = Lagr it − L′rur it if Lagr it > L′rur it, zero otherwise (8)
L′urb-nonagr it = L′urb it − L′urb-agr it (9)
Thus, economically active population outside agriculture is obtained as
L′nonagr it = L′rur-nonagr it + L′urb-nonagr it (10)
Moreover, we can estimate the adjusted population in towns of 5,000
or more inhabitants (excluding those living on agriculture) by re-scaling the
33 In equations (2) to (12) ′ means an approximated estimate, as opposed to the actual value,
since some simplifying assumptions were needed in order to facilitate the computation.
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resulting figures for urban economically active population outside agriculture
with the activity rate (L/N),
N ′urb-nonagr it = L′urb-nonagr it/(L′urb it/Nurb it), (11)
Thus, we can obtain an adjusted rate of urbanization (Uait) that partly
offsets, at least, the upward biased effect of the agro-towns:
Uait = 100 N ′urb-nonagr it/Nit (12)
Regrettably, though, we lack data to compute the share of labour in
agriculture (Lagr/L) at each benchmark year. For Lagr evidence can only be
obtained from the Cadastre de Ensenada (Grupo ’75 1977) for the Kingdom
of Castile in the 1750s, and from Floridablanca’s population census for the
whole of Spain in 1787.34 This shortcoming was also faced by Wrigley (1985)
and Allen (2000). Wrigley (1985) assumed that, in early sixteenth-century
England and France, up to 80 per cent of the rural labour force was in
agriculture and he reduced this figure arbitrarily over the three following
centuries. Allen (2000) accepted the same percentage for most European
countries circa 1500 and interpolated the years up to the first one (1800)
for which he had estimates. In our case we followed Wrigley and Allen and
assumed a fixed 80 per cent share of EAP in agriculture as the starting point
in 1530 and interpolated log-linearly the shares between 1530 and 1787.35
A sensitivity test was carried out assuming that the 1787 Lagr/L remained
unchanged for the entire time span considered. Although slightly different,
the results exhibited the same trends for the adjusted urbanisation rates.36
Spanish urbanisation rates over three and a half centuries, both unadjusted
and adjusted to exclude population living on agriculture, are presented,
alongside those derived by Bairoch, Batou and Che`vre (1988), in Table 6.
The figures by Bairoch and his collaborators suggest a stable rate of
urbanisation of around 20 per cent, with a moderate rise in the sixteenth
century and a similar decline between the mid eighteenth and mid nineteenth
centuries. Our figures, in contrast, indicate a substantial increase in
urbanisation during the 1500s, and a sharp fall in the seventeenth century that
34 Reproduced in Llopis Agela´n (2001).
35 The share of EAP in agriculture in regions of the Kingdom of Castile is systematically
higher in the Floridablanca census (1787) than in the Cadastre de Ensenada (1752). We
opted for the former as it provides an upper bound for our Lagr estimates and, hence, we
bias downwards the adjusted urbanisation rates.
36 The adjusted rates of urbanisation for Spain resulting from accepting the 1787 share of
labour force in agriculture as fixed over the period 1530–87 are only different from those
obtained by assuming that, initially (1530), 80 per cent of the labour force was occupied in
agriculture, for the sixteenth century. Thus, the alternative results are: 12.0, instead of
9.9 per cent, for 1530; and 16.5, instead of 14.5 per cent, for 1591.
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Table 6. Urbanisation rate: alternative estimates (%) (5,000 or more
inhabitants)
Bairoch
Unadjusted new
estimate
Adjusted new
estimate
1530 18.4 12.5 9.9
1591 21.3 20.6 14.5
1700 20.3 11.3 11.1
1750 21.4 14.2 13.5
1787 19.5 24.5 17.4
1857 18.0 31.9 23.2
Note: Excluding the Canary Islands.
Sources: Bairoch et al. (1988), Bairoch (1988).
was reversed during the eighteenth century.37 In the early nineteenth century
both the unadjusted and adjusted rates of urbanisation continued expanding
at 0.4 per cent yearly. It is worth stressing that the discrepancy between the
unadjusted and adjusted urbanisation rates affects mainly Andalusia, Murcia
and Valencia, as a result of the existence of agro-towns (Tables 7 and 8). By
1857, the population living in towns reached around one-fourth of total
population for the adjusted rate (and almost one-third for the unadjusted
one), that is, nearly two and a half times the level in the early sixteenth century
(although only one and a half times compared to 1591). This represents an
annual growth of 0.26 per cent for the adjusted urbanisation rate (0.29 per
cent, for the unadjusted one) over three and a half centuries, while, according
to Bairoch, the rate of urbanisation remained unaltered. Moreover, our
adjusted rate of urbanisation for 1787, 17.6 per cent (including the Canary
Islands), is higher than the one proposed by Llopis and Mariscal (2006)
which ranges between 12.7 and 14.5 per cent.
Highly unequal regional urbanisation rates can be observed.38 The
Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon exhibited clearly different trends. In the
Kingdom of Castile the (unadjusted) rates of 1591 were only comfortably
surpassed in 1787, and then just in Murcia, the Basque Country and New
Castile (due to Madrid’s capital city effect). The slowdown experienced in
the seventeenth century and the subsequent, gradual recovery affected both
the Kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. Population in the cities fell and de-
industrialisation took place in Castile, where the rate of urbanisation slumped
37 Cumulative annual rates of variation for the unadjusted and adjusted urbanisation rates
were, respectively, 0.8 and 0.6 per cent in the sixteenth century, −0.55 and −0.24 per cent
in the seventeenth century, and 0.9 and 0.5 per cent in the eighteenth century.
38 The coefficient of variation was kept around 0.8 for the unadjusted rates and a slightly
lower for the adjusted ones.
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Table 7. Urbanisation rate (% total population) (towns of 5,000 or more
inhabitants)
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Andalusia 33.3 55.0 26.4 31.8 59.6 58.3
Aragon 6.0 6.4 2.9 6.6 13.2 16.0
Asturias 6.8 10.1 4.8 2.1 11.4 13.5
Balearic Islands 22.9 21.7 19.2 21.3 18.1 58.2
Basque 1.3 2.7 2.2 2.8 9.3 21.7
Canary Islands 32.8 26.6
Catalonia 13.8 13.5 13.8 10.7 23.4 31.5
Extremadura 4.8 20.4 1.7 15.1 13.3 32.4
Galicia 4.0 1.2 2.5 2.4 2.2 13.8
Murcia 25.6 35.3 24.7 25.9 53.5 73.6
Navarre 5.1 11.9 6.5 8.3 8.1 19.3
New Castile 6.7 24.3 14.0 26.7 27.7 27.5
Old Castile & Leon 7.9 8.7 4.0 4.5 6.2 9.9
Valencia 19.6 24.7 12.0 18.3 38.7 45.2
Spain
excluding Canary Is. 12.5 20.6 11.3 14.2 24.5 31.9
including Canary Is. 24.6 31.9
Sources: Urban population, Fortea (1995), Correas (1988), completed with Bairoch et al.
(1988).
Total population, as in Table 4.
Table 8. Adjusted urbanisation rate (% total population) (towns of 5,000
or more inhabitants excluding population living on agriculture)
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Andalusia 18.5 20.1 25.7 27.4 27.7 33.8
Aragon 6.0 6.4 2.9 6.6 13.2 16.0
Asturias 6.8 10.1 4.8 2.1 11.4 13.5
Balearic Islands 19.2 21.7 19.2 21.3 18.1 29.7
Basque 1.3 2.7 2.2 2.8 9.3 21.7
Canary Islands 32.8 26.6
Catalonia 13.8 13.5 13.8 10.7 23.4 31.5
Extremadura 4.8 20.4 1.7 15.1 13.3 21.8
Galicia 4.0 1.2 2.5 2.4 2.2 13.8
Murcia 16.3 19.8 24.7 25.9 31.5 23.2
Navarre 5.1 11.9 6.5 8.3 8.1 19.3
New Castile 6.7 24.2 14.0 26.7 27.7 27.5
Old Castile & Leon 7.9 8.7 4.0 4.5 6.2 9.9
Valencia 19.3 22.0 12.0 18.3 30.2 32.4
Spain
excluding Canary Is. 9.9 14.5 11.1 13.5 17.4 23.2
including Canary Is. 17.6 23.3
Sources: As for Table 7. See text.
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to 8.8 per cent in 1646.39 By the mid 1640s, this urban decline had reached
an end, except in New Castile and the Basque Country, where it persisted
until 1700. In contrast, all the regions of the Kingdom of Aragon, except
the Balearic Islands, peaked in the late eighteenth century. Rapid urban
growth during the eighteenth century, especially in its second half, allowed
the Kingdom of Aragon to recover the leading position it had relinquished
during the 1500s.40
Table 9 provides another facet of regional diversity: the pace at which
adjusted rates of urbanisation progressed, that exhibits a much higher
dispersion.41 The growth of the urbanisation rate was impressive in New
Castile and Extremadura during the sixteenth century (more than four times
faster than the national average). Northern regions experienced accelerated
urbanisation in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It is worth
pointing that the adjusted rate of urbanisation did not fall in seventeenth-
century Andalusia (although the unadjusted rate shrank) and this partly
explains the milder contraction in Spain’s adjusted urbanisation rate. The big
urban push of the late eighteenth century in Valencia, Murcia and Catalonia,
after the recovery of the early 1700s, contributed to overcome the national
peak level attained in 1590.
We can conclude, then, by stressing that urbanisation did not remain
stagnant, as suggested by Bairoch, Batou and Che`vre (1988), but experienced
dramatic changes across regions and over time. When placed in a European
perspective, the adjusted urbanisation in Spain grew at a similar pace to the
leading countries (England and the Netherlands) in the sixteenth century;
it fell more dramatically than any other nation during the seventeenth
century; and it recovered in the eighteenth century, achieving a comparable
increase to that of England (Wrigley 1985, Malanima 1998, 2003). In
the early nineteenth century, Spain’s urbanisation gains fell short of
France’s and England’s (Bairoch 1988). On the whole, the increase in
Spain’s rate of urbanisation over the period 1500–1850 was only second to
England’s.
As changes in the ‘adjusted’ urbanisation cast light on the behaviour
outside agriculture, our findings challenge the conventional assessments of
Spanish economic performance and lead us to investigate what happened to
aggregate economic performance.
39 De-industrialisation in Castile is well documented. See Reher (1990) and Lo´pez-Salazar
(1986) for New Castile and Garcı´a Sanz (1986) and Yun-Casalilla (1987) for Old Castile.
40 Lack of data prevents us from measuring the depth of the urbanisation decline in the
Kingdom of Aragon during the seventeenth century.
41 The coefficient of variation reached 2.1 and 2.40 in the sixteenth and early eighteenth
centuries and was a bit lower in the seventeenth (1.6) and the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries (1.4 and 1.3, respectively).
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Table 9. Annual variation of the adjusted urbanisation rate (%)
1530–91 1591–1700 1700–50 1750–87 1700–87 1787–1857 1530–1787 1530–1857
Andalusia 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.03 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.18
Aragon 0.11 −0.72 1.64 1.87 1.74 0.28 0.31 0.30
Asturias 0.66 −0.69 −1.66 4.58 0.99 0.24 0.20 0.21
Balearic Islands 0.20 −0.11 0.21 −0.44 −0.07 0.71 −0.02 0.13
Basque 1.21 −0.20 0.48 3.25 1.66 1.22 0.76 0.86
Canary Islands −0.30
Catalonia −0.03 0.02 −0.51 2.12 0.61 0.42 0.21 0.25
Extremadura 2.36 −2.26 4.33 −0.33 2.35 0.70 0.40 0.46
Galicia −1.96 0.67 −0.07 −0.28 −0.16 2.64 −0.24 0.38
Murcia 0.32 0.20 0.10 0.53 0.28 −0.44 0.26 0.11
Navarre 1.40 −0.55 0.48 −0.08 0.24 1.25 0.18 0.41
New Castile 2.10 −0.50 1.28 0.10 0.78 −0.01 0.55 0.43
Old Castile & Leon 0.17 −0.71 0.22 0.86 0.49 0.67 −0.09 0.07
Valencia 0.22 −0.56 0.84 1.36 1.06 0.10 0.17 0.16
Spain
excluding Canary Is. 0.62 −0.24 0.38 0.69 0.51 0.42 0.22 0.26
including Canary Is. 0.40
Source: Table 8.
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3. Where can we go from here? New conjectural output
estimates
In a pre-industrial economy, according to Wrigley (1985), increases in
real per capita income are, ceteris paribus, linked to the proportion
of the total population living in urban centres.42 This approach finds
support in van Zanden (2001) who argues that ‘regional differences in
levels of development . . . are perhaps best approached via variations in the
urbanization ratio’.43 More cautious, Malanima (2003), in the case of early
modern Italy, uses urbanisation to capture output trends in the industrial and
service sectors,44 while he computes agricultural output indirectly through
a demand approach. Analogously, van Zanden (2001, pp. 71–2) employs
a ‘development index’ derived by combining population and urbanisation
ratios to measure European countries’ progress between 1500 and 1800.
Our strategy to arrive at aggregate output estimates for economic activities
outside agriculture has been, following Malanima’s (2003) approach, to
accept adjusted urbanisation as a proxy. However, efficiency changes
resulting from variations in the sectoral composition of labour and in
the dependency rate could affect our proposed index. We have, then,
carried out a sensitivity test by estimating the intersectoral shift effect
that results from changes in the shares of industry and services in non-
agricultural employment and the productivity gap between industry and
services. Furthermore, we allowed for changes in the potentially active to
total population ratio (PAP/N) that could affect our index.
Services increased relative to manufacturing in terms of output and
employment in early modern Spain (Garcı´a Sanz 1991a, Lo´pez-Salazar 1986,
Reher 1990) probably as a consequence of the ‘Dutch disease’ provoked
by the inflow of American silver (Forsyth and Nicholas 1983, Drelichman
42 In the historical literature parallels have been drawn between movements of urbanisation
rates and those of per capita GDP. The link between increasing urbanisation and
economic growth is predicated on the fact that cities spread the use of the market and
stimulate innovation (North 1982, Boserup 1987). Urbanisation, according to Kuznets
(1966), represents ‘an increasing division of labor within the country, growing
specialization, and the shift of many activities from nonmarket-oriented pursuit within the
family or the village to specialized market-oriented business firms’. Cf. Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2005), Craig and Fisher (2000), Reis (2005), Temin (2006),
Wrigley (1985).
43 Cf. Craig and Fisher (2000, p. 114) for a similar proposal that includes using changes in
the urbanisation rate as a proxy for per capita income growth.
44 Malanima (2003, p. 281) emphasised that he did not identify urban population with the
share of the labour force outside agriculture but, rather, suggested a relationship between
urbanisation and non-agricultural output, regardless whether industrial and services
output was produced in town or countryside. Malanima (2003, pp. 281–3) ran a
regression between the share of non-agricultural activities in GDP and the urbanisation
rate over the period 1861–1938 and used the parameters from the regression to predict the
relative size of industry and services for each level of urbanisation.
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2005).45 Given the lack of national data, we arbitrarily assumed that
the evolution of the internal composition of non-agricultural employment
in Spain over three hundred years was captured by the shares in non-
agricultural economically active population (Li+s) in industry (Li/Li+s) and
services (Ls/Li+s) in Cuenca (Reher 1990).
As regards the productivity ratio between industry and services, lack of
data forced us to accept a fixed ratio (1.4) derived from the Cadastre de
Ensenada for the Kingdom of Castile c. 1750 over the entire period (1530–
1750). The resulting intersectoral shift effect [IS = (Ls/Li+s) + (1.4 (Li/Li+s)]
shows a mild decline over time.46
Changes in the potentially active to total population ratio (PAP/N) can
also affect our index of output outside agriculture. Alas, we only know the
evolution of the PAP/N ratio for the case of New Castile from 1586 onwards,
which does not exhibit major changes over time.
Therefore, trends in the proposed index of output outside agriculture
do not appear to be significantly altered by either demographic or output
composition changes.
We have estimated agricultural output indirectly. Given the lack of hard
empirical evidence, two alternative ways of deriving its trends have been put
forward for early modern Europe. Wrigley’s (1985) proposal assumes that,
in the long run, food consumption per head is roughly constant. This way
output in agriculture evolves as does total population (adjusted, when data
are available, for the agricultural trade balance) and labour productivity
can easily be derived if we have crude estimates for the economically
active population in agriculture.47 Crafts (1976, 1980, 1985) criticised the
assumption of constant per capita food consumption, arguing that the values
of price and income elasticities of demand for food in developing countries
are significantly different from zero.48
45 For example, in Segovia (Old Castile), an industrial centre, services went from
representing 17.6 per cent of the economically active population employed outside
agriculture in 1561, to 19.4 in 1586, and to 22.3 per cent in 1750 (Garcı´a Sanz 1991a,
p. 161). In New Castile, the relative size of services also increased within non-agricultural
employment. According to Lo´pez-Salazar (1986, p. 24–42), in Ciudad Real, it rose from
36 per cent in 1690 to 50 per cent by 1750. More detailed information is provided by
Reher (1990, p. 27) for Cuenca, where services moved up from 29 per cent in 1561 to 49
in 1752 and, then, to 64 per cent in 1856.
46 If alternatively the productivity gap for the 1850s were used (Prados de la Escosura 2003),
the productivity index would rise slightly over the period 1750–1850.
47 Such a method was already used (sometimes adjusting for the food trade balance) for
eighteenth-century Britain (Deane and Cole 1967, Overton 1996), nineteenth-century
Spain (Simpson 1989, 1995) and, more recently, late medieval Italy (Federico and
Malanima 2004).
48 However, recent research on present-day poor countries reveals that consumption per
head of food staples remains constant in aggregate terms as per capita income rises (Bouis
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The most recent estimate using the demand function approach has been
that of Allen (2000) who derived agricultural output per head and per worker
for a sample of pre-industrial European countries.49 He firstly estimated
agricultural consumption per head that, once adjusted for net food imports,
allowed him to derive output per head. Then, total output was obtained
from population figures and divided by the economically active population
in agriculture to estimate labour productivity. Real consumption per head of
agricultural goods (C) can be expressed as,
C = a Pε Wµ Mγ (13)
in which a represents a constant to which Allen (2000) arbitrarily assigned
the value of one, P and M denote agricultural, and non-agricultural prices
relative to the consumer price index (CPI), W stands for real wages, while ε,
µ and γ are the values of own price, income and cross-price elasticities,
respectively. If we now take rates of variation (denoted in lower case), we
get:
c = ε p + µw + γ m (14)
We have replicated Allen’s calculations for the main Spanish regions at
given benchmarks between 1530 and 1857 and, later, derived a national
figure. Since we could only estimate agricultural consumption per head
for seven regions through the demand approach, we obtained a national
estimate by applying a scalar to these regions’ population weighted average.
Such scalar was the ratio between the national average and that for those
seven regions derived through the Wrigley approach.
We adopted Federico and Malanima’s (2004) guesses for own price (ε =
−0.5), income (µ= 0.4) and cross-price (γ = 0.1) elasticities of demand.50
Alternatively, elasticities could have been adjusted over time as income per
head changes. The literature shows that income elasticity for food falls as per
capita expenditure goes up (Engel’s Law), while the opposite tends to occur,
in absolute values, for its own price elasticity (Lluch et al. 1977). However,
since per capita income in early modern Spain remained at low levels, the
range within which expenditure and own price elasticities would fluctuate is
1994). It should be noted that Wrigley’s proposal is a particular case of a demand function
of agricultural goods in which price and income elasticities are zero.
49 Crafts (1976, 1980, 1985) pioneered the use of the demand approach to derive agricultural
consumption and output. The method was later used by Jackson (1985) and Allen (1999)
for eighteenth-century Britain and by Prados de la Escosura (1988, 1989) for
nineteenth-century Spain.
50 The significant similarities between Spain and Italy suggested we do this. Allen (2000)
assumed slightly different values for own price (ε =−0.6) and income (µ= 0.5) elasticities
of demand. We replicated the exercise using Allen’s values and the results did not change
significantly. These alternative computations are available upon request.
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rather narrow, and so is the range for the output estimates obtained using
alternative elasticities.
Due to lack of trade data for most of the considered period, we had to
assume, as Allen (2000) did for most European countries, that agricultural
trade was balanced.51 Fortunately, the available evidence for the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries indicates that trade represented a
small share of agricultural output.52 In any case, the assumption of balanced
agricultural trade seems more acceptable at national than at regional level
and these regional trade imbalances may affect our regional output estimates.
During the eighteenth century some regions, such as Old Castile, sent their
surpluses in grain and wine production to the northern coast, while Aragon
supplied Catalonia with cereals (Ringrose 1970, Llopis 2001). However,
the recurrent deficit in cereals in the coastal regions was often covered by
imports from abroad as transport costs represented a serious obstacle to
trade in commodities of low value per unit of volume (Palacio Atard 1960,
Zabala Uriarte 1983). A similar situation can be depicted for the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries (Grafe 2001).
Thus, output per head (q) equals, by construction, per capita consumption
(C), and labour productivity can be, then, derived as:
(Q/L)agr = q N/Lagr (15)
We departed from Allen’s estimates of agricultural output in early
modern Spain by using different regional data sets for agricultural and
non-agricultural prices, consumer price indices (CPI), and real unskilled
wages (W).53
51 The first official computation of trade flows corresponds to 1792 (Prados de la Escosura
1982a), and reconstructions of Spain’s trade with its major partners in the eighteenth
century (Romano 1957, Prados de la Escosura 1984) do not provide the trade balance for
agricultural goods.
52 It can be reckoned that Spain was a net food importer in the late eighteenth century up to,
at most, 5 per cent of GDP and no more than 10 per cent of agricultural output (Prados
de la Escosura 1993, pp. 271–3, 276). By the mid nineteenth century, however, Spain was
a net exporter of foodstuffs, though but no more than 5 per cent of agricultural output
(Prados de la Escosura 1988, 2003). This conjectural calculation suggests that the
improvement in consumption per head between 1787 and 1857 should be raised by
around 15 per cent to represent the increase in agricultural output per head. As a
consequence, our estimates are tend to be downward biased over the period 1787–1857.
53 All prices and wages were quoted in silver. Agricultural prices were constructed for
Catalonia, New Castile and Andalusia on the basis of prices quoted in Feliu (1991) and
weights for cereals, meat, poultry, wine and olive oil for 1789 (Feliu 2004). We used wheat
prices from other sources. Thus, for Old Castile, wheat prices come from Hamilton
(1934, 1947); for Murcia, from Caro Lo´pez (1985); for Valencia, from Palop Ramos
(1975) and Hamilton (1934, 1947); and for Majorca, from Vaquer Bennassar (1987).
Textile prices, kindly supplied by Joan Rose´s (private communication), were used as
non-agricultural prices. Wages were taken from Felı´u (2004) for Catalonia; Reher and
Ballesteros (1993) for New Castile; Moreno (2002) for Old Castile; and Allen (2001) for
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The use of unskilled, instead of average, wage rates does not alter our
results as the skill premium remained relatively stable in early modern
Spain.54 Only if the shares of skilled and unskilled workers within the labour
force had changed significantly over time would the growth rates of average
and unskilled wages differ.55
Evidence on wages refers only to wage rates and not to wage earnings, as no
adjustment is made for the number of hours worked per person every year.
Changes in work intensity affect wage earnings. In the early modern age,
an intensification in the time allocated to work occurred, either to offset the
decline in wages rates by increasing the amount of working time (van Zanden
1999) or because the wider consumption choices resulting from new indus-
trial developments increased the opportunity cost of leisure (de Vries 1994,
Voth 1998, Allen 2004b).56 If in Spain, for example, the number of yearly
hours per worker increased over time, as was the case in late eighteenth-
century England (Voth 1998, 2001), then our real wage rates would only
provide a lower bound for the actual improvement in real wage earnings.57
In Spain, an intensification of work might have taken place since the mid
eighteenth century as a result of the shift from extensive livestock rearing
(sheep) to crops (wheat, vineyards, olives but also cash crops along the
Mediterranean coast) as population grew and relative prices changed, or
during the first half of the nineteenth century as a consequence of the
wider access to property after the disentailment of church and communal
lands (desamortizacio´n). Alas, we cannot verify and, even less, quantify these
hypotheses. Nonetheless, the fact that cultivated land multiplied by 2.4 over
the first half of the nineteenth century (Bringas 2000, p. 86) while, according
to our own estimates, employment in agriculture multiplied by 1.5, lends
some support to these conjectures.
The only evidence as regards the amount of days worked in different sec-
tors of the economy comes from the Cadastre de Ensenada (Ringrose 1983).
We have weighted the number of working days assigned in the Cadastre to
Valencia. The CPIs used come from Reher and Ballesteros (1993) for New Castile; Feliu
(2004) for Catalonia; Allen (2001) for Valencia; and Llopis et al. (2000) for Old Castile.
As a rule, when the coverage of wages and prices was incomplete for a given region it was
assumed that they moved in the same way as those available for the closer region (namely,
Andalusian prices or wages were assumed to move like those for New Castile, and
Valencia prices and wages like those for Catalonia).
54 The skill premium, that is, the skilled/unskilled wage ratio, was computed for masons and
carpenters in Catalonia, Valencia and New Castile from data in Feliu (1991).
55 Unfortunately, we do not have information regarding the shares of skilled and unskilled
workers within the labour force and their evolution over time.
56 The improvement of housing, the acquisition of durable goods and the increasing
consumption of exotic goods has been pointed as evidence of material progress just at the
time real wages were declining (Reis 2005, p. 199).
57 In such a case, the increase in the number of hours worked per year would offset the
decline in wage rates.
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farmers (120), artisans (180) and servants (250) by the shares of agriculture,
industry and services within total employment. We used our estimates of the
labour shares in agriculture and in the rest of the economy (see the discussion
above) and made an attempt to decompose employment outside agriculture
into industrial and services’ shares. Since we only had data for the Kingdom
of Castile since 1750 (and from 1787 onwards for the Crown of Aragon) we
arbitrarily assumed that, prior to 1750, the shares of industry and services
within the non-agricultural labour force moved, in each Spanish region,
along with those for Cuenca (Reher 1990). The amount of days worked
per occupied person resulting from the decline in the share of agricultural
employment and the rise of that for services increased, on average, at less
than 0.1 per cent per year over the considered period.58 Such a mild increase
in the amount of working days per occupied person/year would have only a
minor effect in our estimates so we decided not to take it on board.59
Some caveats about the use of real wages as a proxy for per capita income
are necessary. Using wage rates as a proxy for per capita income hides
‘the contribution of property-income growth to the overall rise of national
income’ (Hoffman et al. 2002). Even in rural areas in mid-eighteenth-century
Old Castile, where income distribution was considered to be less unequal, the
wealthiest 10 per cent outweighed the poorest 40 per cent by 15 to 17 times
(computed from Yun-Casalilla 1987).60 Similar ratios have been observed
for England (14 times), and France (17 times) around 1750 (Hoffman et al.
2002). Gini coefficients for income distribution at different Old Castile towns
c. 1750 cast values ranging from 0.39 to 0.56, while similar estimates were
obtained for Jerez (around 0.5).61
The use of real wages to proxy the evolution of real per capita GDP
implies assuming the stability of income distribution. A way of testing such
a strong proposition is by looking at the trends in income inequality that
provide relative factor returns.62 Land rent/wage ratios for Andalusia, Castile
and Catalonia rose throughout the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, while
58 In England, the amount of hours worked per occupied person rose at 0.6 per cent per year
over the period 1760–1800 (Voth 1998).
59 We have computed a new set of estimates adjusting the wage rates with the increase in the
amount of days worked and the results are available upon request.
60 Income distribution in Old Castile has usually been considered less unequal than in
regions of large estates (Spain’s south). Catalonia, in turn, has been traditionally
considered a region of less social inequality than the Kingdom of Castile since the 1486
Guadalupe Ruling (Sentencia arbitral de Guadalupe) introduced new property rights of
land that differed from those prevailing in the Kingdom of Castile. In the case of the
capital city, Madrid, the Gini reaches 0.77 (computed from data in Ringrose 1983).
61 Estimates obtained from data in Yun-Casalilla (1987), Ramos Palencia (2001) and Abbott
(1990). These figures are close to those computed for England and Wales in 1759 (0.52)
by Peter Lindert (www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/Massie1759rev.htm).
62 As Hoffman et al. (2002, p. 325) point out, real inequality was ‘caused by the interaction
of population growth with concentrated land ownership and the Engel’s law’.
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Figure 3. Land rent/wage ratios, 1500–1860 (1790/99= 1)
Sources: Land rent, Andalusia (Ponsot 1986), Old Castile (Sebastia´n Amarilla 1990),
Catalonia (Duran 1985); wages, for Andalusia we used New Castile’s (Reher and
Ballesteros (1993), Old Castile (Moreno 2002), Catalonia (Felı´u 2004).
they declined in the seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries (Figure 3).63
Moreover, as incomes in the middle and upper part of the distribution are
not captured, in periods of rising inequality (as were the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries) our output estimates provide a lower bound of the
actual performance of Spanish agriculture.64
63 Scattered evidence indicates that the incomes of the middle and upper classes were
growing in early modern Spain, while those of the lower classes were stagnant or declining
(Nader 1977).
64 As a test, we have estimated per capita consumption of food for Spain over the period
1850–1913 with a demand function (and a common data set from Prados de la Escosura
2003), using alternatively wages (Bringas 2000) and GDP per head as indicators of per
capita income. The results confirm the downward bias introduced when wages are
employed as a proxy for income per head. Food consumption would grow at 0.06 per cent
annually when estimated using real wages (ε =−0.5, µ= 0.4, γ = 1), while it would reach
0.42 per cent if real per capita GDP is used instead. Interestingly, when agricultural
consumption per head for eighteenth-century England is derived with a demand function,
Crafts (1985), using per capita income, also reaches a faster pace of growth than Jackson
(1985) and Allen (1999), employing real wages.
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Furthermore, since we are employing real wages to proxy real per capita
GDP, deflators matter too. In the case of nominal wages, a consumer
price index is usually used to obtain real wages, while the GDP implicit
deflator, that reflects the prices of both consumption and investment goods,
is employed to derive real aggregate output. These two price indices do not
necessarily evolve alike and the use of real wages as a short-cut for real GDP
per head probably adds another bias to our output estimates.65
Although from a theoretical point of view estimates of agricultural output
derived through the demand approach are superior, and we focus our discus-
sion on them, alternative estimates obtained with Wrigley’s approach – albeit
the unrealistic implicit assumptions about price and income elasticities –
are also provided as a counterpoint. The Wrigley approach assumes a
constant consumption per head of agricultural goods and, as we were forced
to assume further that agricultural trade was balanced, agricultural output
per head is taken as constant in this set of estimates. We have made an
exploratory attempt at reconciling these alternative estimates of agricultural
output by attributing their differences to work intensification. We estimated
the rate of variation for real wage earnings (w′) compatible with a zero
growth rate for per capita consumption of agricultural goods (c), as posited
by the Wrigley approach, keeping unaltered the values of the rest of the
variables and the elasticities. Thus, using equation (14) and assuming c = 0,
we rearranged it to derive w′ as follows,
w′ = (ε p + γ m)/µ (16)
Then, the difference between the counterfactual (w′) and the actual (w)
rates of variation of real wages would cast the annual change in hours worked
per occupied person (h),
h = w′ − w (17)
It transpires from this conjectural exercise that, in the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries, for the agricultural output estimates derived through
the demand approach to match those obtained with the Wrigley approach,
the amount of hours per worker would have needed to grow at yearly rates of
0.6 and 0.8 per cent, respectively. These rates are within the range suggested
for late eighteenth-century England (Voth 2001).66 It can be objected that the
opportunity cost of leisure was probably higher in England during the first
stages of the Industrial Revolution than in early modern Spain. However, the
dramatic decline of Spanish real wages might have been a powerful stimulus
65 Hoffman et al. (2002) have shown that the different evolution of consumer price indices
for lower and upper social classes constitutes an additional source of inequality in income
distribution in early modern England, France and the Netherlands.
66 Voth (2001, pp. 1075–6) estimates that, in agriculture, the amount of hours worked grew
at 0.8 per cent annually between 1750 and 1800, while for the whole English economy it
ranged between 0.6 and 0.7 per cent.
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Table 10. Agricultural output (Spain in 1857= 100)
Panel A. Demand approach∗
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Spain 48.2 61.9 66.0 68.9 61.6 100.0
New Castile 7.6 11.2 8.7 8.7 7.3 10.1
Andalusia 9.6 9.0 13.2 11.6 13.0 22.4
Murcia 1.0 1.5 2.4 2.8 2.5 3.4
Old Castile/Leon 14.1 17.0 12.4 13.6 10.3 15.6
Valencia 3.1 3.6 4.0 5.9 4.8 8.9
Balearic Is. 1.3 1.7 2.6 1.6 1.7 2.9
Catalonia 2.2 2.6 4.5 5.7 5.4 11.6
Panel B. Wrigley approach
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Spain 31.5 44.8 49.3 61.1 68.3 100.0
Asturias 0.6 1.0 1.1 2.5 2.7 4.1
New Castile 4.2 7.8 6.2 6.6 7.7 10.1
Andalusia 5.8 8.2 11.0 12.1 14.1 22.4
Murcia 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.5 3.4
Old Castile/Leon 9.8 11.9 8.9 12.2 11.7 15.6
Extremadura 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.8 4.7
Galicia 1.3 2.4 3.9 6.0 6.4 8.5
Aragon 2.3 2.7 4.7 4.6 5.5 7.8
Valencia 2.0 2.6 3.2 5.0 5.6 8.9
Balearic Is. 1.0 1.3 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.9
Catalonia 1.8 2.6 3.6 5.3 6.3 11.6
Note: ∗Demand approach (e =−0.5; g = 0.4; b = 0.1).
Sources: Relative regional levels for 1857, Rose´s (2003, background computations);
benchmark for Spain in 1857, Prados de la Escosura (2003). Indices of agricultural
output, see the text and the sources provided in footnote 53.
to work longer hours. Our proposal is, then, to consider the output estimates
derived through the Wrigley approach as an upper bound for agricultural
performance for the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries.
Table 10 offers levels of agricultural output at regional and national levels,
expressed with Spain in 1857 as 100. Notice that panel A in this table (and
in Tables 11–13) contains information for just seven regions as it was only
for them that agricultural output could be obtained through the demand
approach.67 Total output doubled over the early modern age in Spain (and
trebled when obtained through the Wrigley approach) but with a large
variance across regions. More interesting, however, is the information on
agricultural labour productivity contained in Table 11. A major feature is the
long-run decline in output per EAP across the board, with the exception
of Catalonia. A moderate productivity fall occurred in Spain during the
67 Basque and Navarre regions are also missing in panel B of Tables 10 and 11 as we have not
been able to ascertain their shares in Spain’s agricultural output in 1850/9, our benchmark
year for linking each region’s output to the national level.
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Table 11. Agricultural output per economically active population (Spain
in 1857= 100)
Panel A. Demand approach∗
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Spain 130.5 123.4 131.0 113.5 92.3 100.0
New Castile 153.6 130.1 146.0 145.1 108.9 115.0
Andalusia 155.8 106.4 124.2 101.5 97.6 116.3
Murcia 125.6 129.3 146.6 127.7 86.7 78.9
Old Castile/Leon 112.9 120.4 133.3 113.2 93.2 88.2
Valencia 140.6 127.8 125.2 119.8 87.9 106.6
Balearic Is. 181.5 200.8 294.2 192.8 185.5 160.2
Catalonia 105.5 91.4 120.7 109.5 88.2 124.1
c.v. 0.19 0.27 0.40 0.24 0.33 0.23
Panel B. Wrigley approach
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Spain 85.5 89.3 97.7 100.7 102.3 100.0
Asturias 96.3 95.8 96.5 96.8 95.7 99.4
New Castile 84.7 90.1 104.5 110.1 115.3 115.0
Andalusia 94.4 96.3 103.5 105.9 106.4 116.3
Murcia 72.5 75.6 85.5 89.5 88.6 78.9
Old Castile/Leon 78.4 84.0 95.8 101.4 105.6 88.2
Extremadura 82.5 84.0 92.3 93.5 95.9 85.0
Galicia 59.6 60.7 62.2 63.0 63.6 60.3
Aragon 109.8 117.1 132.9 138.9 142.2 115.2
Valencia 89.3 92.4 99.2 101.9 103.3 106.6
Balearic Is. 139.4 154.6 186.2 202.5 215.9 160.2
Catalonia 86.3 90.3 97.8 102.0 102.5 124.1
c.v. 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.26
Note: ∗Demand approach (e =−0.5; g = 0.4; b = 0.1).
Sources: Regional output levels, Table 10. Economically active population in agriculture, see
text.
sixteenth century (−0.09 per cent), followed by a return to the initial levels in
1700. The eighteenth century witnessed a more intense contraction in output
per worker (at −0.4 per cent per year), only partially reversed in the first half
of the nineteenth century. The proposed upper bound figures for labour
productivity, derived from the Wrigley approach (panel B), would reverse
the contraction of the sixteenth century (+0.07 per cent per year), and turn
the decline of the eighteenth century into a very mild advance (0.05 per
cent).
Two clear-cut phases appear to exist in the regional behaviour. Remarkable
disparities took place in the evolution of labour productivity across regions
over the period 1530–1700, and its dispersion, as measured by the coefficient
of variation, doubled. Regional variance, then, declined in the early
eighteenth century and, after a reversal in the second half of the century,
fell again in the early nineteenth century to recover the 1750 levels.
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When our results are compared with those of other European countries
(Allen 2000, Federico and Malanima 2004) we observe that the Spanish
productivity decline over the sixteenth century was milder than in most
countries (the Netherlands, in which it remained unaltered, was the
exception), while its sharp contraction during the eighteenth century was
at odds with the productivity gains achieved in England, France and the
Netherlands, and even with the mild fall suffered in (central-north) Italy.
In the seventeenth century Spain sided with France and Italy in achieving
minor productivity improvements while the Low Countries and England
forged ahead. Again, in the early nineteenth century, Spain and Italy fell
short of the gains in output per worker obtained in Britain, France and the
Netherlands (Allen 2004a, Smits et al. 2000, Toutain 1997).
Once agricultural output (q N) was obtained, we combined it with
the indicator of economic activity outside agriculture (namely, adjusted
urbanisation, N′urb-nonagr it) to reach an estimate of aggregate output (O).
In order to do so, agricultural and non-agricultural output were expressed in
index form with 1857 as 100, and, then, weighted by their shares in GDP in
1850–9 – the earliest dates for which national accounts are available– (Prados
de la Escosura 2003),
O.t = Sa.1850/59(q.t N.t)/(q.1857 N.1857)
+ (1 − Sa.1850/9) ∗ (N ′urb-nonagr .t/N ′urb-nonagr .1857) (18)
where Sa.1850/9 represents the average share of agriculture in GDP in the
1850s (0.404). Regional weights by sector were obtained by applying each
region’s share in agricultural and non-agricultural output (Rose´s 2003) to
their national levels (Prados de la Escosura 2003). The use of this equation
does not imply that the share of agriculture in GDP remains constant over
time. On the contrary, in so far as output in each economic sector evolves at
a different pace, their shares in GDP will vary over time.68
A caveat is needed about home, non-marketed production. Do our
estimates proxy GDP or just ‘market income’? In the case of agricultural
68 The share of agriculture in GDP, at constant prices of 1850/9, is as follows:
Demand approach Wrigley approach
1530 0.70 0.61
1591 0.59 0.52
1700 0.65 0.59
1750 0.57 0.54
1787 0.45 0.48
1857 0.40 0.40
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Table 12. Total output (Spain in 1857= 100)
Panel A (computed with agricultural output derived through the demand approach∗)
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Spain 27.5 41.7 40.8 48.9 55.4 100.0
New Castile 3.9 11.1 6.5 9.7 10.6 14.0
Andalusia 5.7 6.5 10.3 10.5 12.1 22.5
Murcia 0.6 0.9 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.0
Old Castile/Leon 9.0 11.4 6.4 7.8 7.4 13.2
Valencia 1.8 2.2 2.1 3.6 4.4 7.8
Balearic Is. 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.1 2.3
Catalonia 1.5 1.9 3.0 3.7 5.9 13.9
Panel B (computed with agricultural output derived through the Wrigley approach)
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Spain 20.8 34.8 34.0 45.8 58.1 100.0
Asturias 0.3 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.6 2.6
Basque 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.1 1.7 3.0
Navarre 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.9
New Castile 2.6 9.8 5.5 8.9 10.7 14.0
Andalusia 4.2 6.1 9.4 10.7 12.6 22.5
Murcia 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.7 3.0
Old Castile/Leon 7.4 9.4 5.1 7.2 7.9 13.2
Extremadura 1.0 2.3 1.0 1.6 1.8 3.7
Galicia 0.6 1.0 1.7 2.6 2.7 5.6
Aragon 1.2 1.5 2.2 2.5 4.0 6.3
Valencia 1.3 1.9 1.8 3.3 4.7 7.8
Balearic Is. 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 2.3
Catalonia 1.3 1.9 2.7 3.5 6.3 13.9
Note: ∗Demand approach (e =−0.5; g = 0.4; b = 0.1).
Sources: Relative regional levels for 1857, Rose´s (2003, background computations) and
A´lvarez Llano (1986) for Basque and Navarre; national level, Prados de la Escosura (2003);
output by sector, Tables 8 and 10. See text.
output, home production is captured in our Wrigley approach estimates,
as it assumes constant consumption of agricultural goods per head, but
it is far less clear that this is also the case for our preferred demand
approach estimates. As for non-agricultural output, a non-negligible share
was contributed by the (urban and rural) active population in agricultural
activities and we fail to capture it. It is worth pointing, nonetheless, that
there was an early use of the market even in remote regions of Spain
(Domı´nguez Martı´n 1994). Moreover, the so-called ‘agro-towns’ tended to
facilitate production for the market. Our conjecture is that the inclusion of
non-marketed production might have a counter-cyclical effect, moderating
the intensity of both the decline and rise of output over time that we offer
here, and this deserves to be explored in future research.
Trends in total product and product per head at both regional and
national levels are offered in Tables 12 and 13, while annual growth per head
is provided in Table 14. GDP multiplied by 3.6 over three hundred years
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Table 13. Total output per head (Spain in 1857= 100)
Panel A (computed with agricultural output derived through the demand approach∗)
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Spain 87.2 93.0 82.7 80.1 81.0 100.0
New Castile 98.6 150.2 109.6 154.3 143.2 144.9
Andalusia 113.6 92.6 108.8 101.5 100.4 117.2
Murcia 90.4 96.1 105.5 98.1 93.3 78.2
Old Castile/Leon 89.6 93.2 70.1 62.0 61.0 82.3
Valencia 97.1 93.6 72.2 78.9 85.0 94.8
Balearic Is. 128.2 133.7 146.2 110.4 97.0 132.6
Catalonia 88.2 78.9 88.6 73.5 100.0 128.1
c.v. 0.15 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.24
Panel B (computed with agricultural output derived through the Wrigley approach)
1530 1591 1700 1750 1787 1857
Spain 65.9 77.6 69.0 75.0 85.0 100.0
Asturias 60.3 68.0 55.7 49.4 71.0 75.8
Basque 67.2 70.2 69.1 70.3 83.8 109.6
Navarre 69.3 83.8 72.3 76.1 75.6 99.4
New Castile 65.9 132.3 93.6 141.5 145.4 144.9
Andalusia 84.5 87.9 99.8 103.4 104.1 117.2
Murcia 65.2 71.7 81.0 83.4 94.0 78.2
Old Castile/Leon 73.1 77.1 55.5 57.7 65.4 82.3
Extremadura 49.3 80.1 43.1 69.6 66.2 83.0
Galicia 33.7 29.6 31.5 31.4 31.0 48.3
Aragon 73.1 74.5 62.2 75.2 98.5 108.6
Valencia 73.3 77.8 61.3 71.6 91.2 94.8
Balearic Is. 108.6 114.4 108.7 113.5 106.2 132.6
Catalonia 79.1 78.4 79.0 70.5 105.7 128.1
c.v. 0.25 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.31 0.27
Note: ∗Demand approach (e =−0.5; g = 0.4; b = 0.1).
Sources: Total output, Table 12; population, as in Table 4.
(Table 12, panel A) but, as population more than trebled, the increase in
real product per head was reduced to just 15 per cent (Table 13, panel A).
Per capita GDP experienced a mild increase in the sixteenth century,
followed by a contraction of similar intensity in the seventeenth century,
stagnation over the eighteenth century, and non-negligible growth in the early
nineteenth century that led, by the 1850s, to overcome the levels achieved
in the late sixteenth century. Interestingly, product per head obtained with
agricultural output alternatively derived through the demand and Wrigley
approaches cast similar growth rates for the long seventeenth century, and
not far apart for the early nineteenth century, so their discrepancies are
restricted to the sixteenth and, especially, the eighteenth century. As we have
proposed the Wrigley approach as an upper bound, there is some room in
our conjectural estimates for more intense growth in the sixteenth century
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Table 14. Annual growth of total output per head (%)
Panel A (computed with agricultural output derived through the demand approach)
1530–91 1591–1700 1700–87 1787–1857 1530–1787 1591–1787 1530–1857
Spain 0.11 −0.11 −0.02 0.30 −0.03 −0.07 0.04
New Castile 0.69 −0.29 0.31 0.02 0.15 −0.02 0.12
Andalusia −0.34 0.15 −0.09 0.22 −0.05 0.04 0.01
Murcia 0.10 0.09 −0.14 −0.25 0.01 −0.02 −0.04
Old Castile/Leon 0.07 −0.26 −0.16 0.43 −0.15 −0.22 −0.03
Valencia −0.06 −0.24 0.19 0.16 −0.05 −0.05 −0.01
Balearic Is. 0.07 0.08 −0.47 0.45 −0.11 −0.16 0.01
Catalonia −0.18 0.11 0.14 0.35 0.05 0.12 0.11
Panel B (computed with agricultural output derived through the Wrigley approach)
1530–91 1591–1700 1700–87 1787–1857 1530–1787 1591–1787 1530–1857
Spain 0.27 −0.11 0.24 0.23 0.10 0.05 0.13
Asturias 0.20 −0.18 0.28 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.07
Basque 0.07 −0.01 0.22 0.38 0.09 0.09 0.15
Navarre 0.31 −0.13 0.05 0.39 0.03 −0.05 0.11
New Castile 1.14 −0.32 0.51 −0.01 0.31 0.05 0.24
Andalusia 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.10
Murcia 0.16 0.11 0.17 −0.26 0.14 0.14 0.06
Old Castile/Leon 0.09 −0.30 0.19 0.33 −0.04 −0.08 0.04
Extremadura 0.80 −0.57 0.49 0.32 0.11 −0.10 0.16
Galicia −0.21 0.06 −0.02 0.63 −0.03 0.02 0.11
Aragon 0.03 −0.17 0.53 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.12
Valencia 0.10 −0.22 0.46 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08
Balearic Is. 0.08 −0.05 −0.03 0.32 −0.01 −0.04 0.06
Catalonia −0.01 0.01 0.33 0.27 0.11 0.15 0.15
Sources: Table 13.
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(up to 0.27 per cent per year) and growth (0.24 per cent) rather than
stagnation in the eighteenth century (panels A and B in Table 14). In the
most favourable scenario, real product per head could have increased up to
52 (Table 13, panel B) rather than 15 per cent over three and a half centuries
(Table 13, panel A).
A large variance across regions is observed in real product per head. Only
Catalonia and New Castile (largely due to the rise of Madrid, the capital city)
increased their output per head in the long run. Nonetheless, while in New
Castile the increase took place in the sixteenth century, and this level was
recovered by 1750, only to stagnate thereafter, in Catalonia a sustained rise in
per capita income is observed since the mid eighteenth century. Another fea-
ture that deserves to be highlighted is the uneven impact of the seventeenth-
century crisis, mainly circumscribed to the Kingdom of Castile (the two
Castiles, but also Extremadura) and to Valencia, the latter usually associated
with the expulsion of the Moors (Regla´ 1953, Elliott 1961, Casey 1971).69
How do our new estimates compare with previous assessments of Spanish
performance? Table 15 shows that, when agricultural output is derived
through the demand approach, our real product per head is on the lower
bound of the available conjectural estimates. Its 15 per cent increase
over the period 1530–1857 is just one-fourth of Maddison’s figure. A
differential feature of our estimates is, alongside Maddison’s, its suggestion
that real output per head grew in the sixteenth century. Our estimates for
the seventeenth century show the sharpest decline, close to van Zanden
(2005a).70 Again for the eighteenth century our figures are on the pessimistic
side, compared to van Zanden (2005b). In turn, the early nineteenth-century
recovery is, according to our figures (one-fourth increase), more intense than
Maddison’s estimates. However, our alternative output estimates, in which
the Wrigley approach is used to derive agriculture product, match rather
well the mild but steady growth view Maddison presents for early modern
Spain, except for the seventeenth-century decline. Since these alternative
figures represent an upper bound of the actual growth, it can be concluded
that Maddison’s estimates provide an excessively favourable depiction of
pre-1850 Spain’s economic performance.
Do our new conjectural estimates modify to some extent the established
wisdom about Spain’s relative performance within Europe? In order to
provide an answer we have introduced them in van Zanden (2005a) and
Maddison (2003) data sets, expressed relative to the UK per capita GDP level
69 As Kamen (1978, p. 41) put it, ‘It is clear that “decline” did not fall like a blanket over the
whole country . . . but that different parts of the peninsula experienced disparate rates of
development.’
70 Thus, we provide support for Hamilton’s (1938) perception of growth in the sixteenth and
decline in the seventeenth century.
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Table 15. New proposal for per capita GDP: comparative perspective
Panel A. Levels
1530∗ 1591∗∗ 1700 1750 1787∗∗∗ 1857
New estimates: Demand approach 93.7 100.0 88.9 86.1 87.1 107.5
Wrigley approach 84.9 100.0 88.9 96.6 109.5 128.9
Yun-Casalilla∗∗∗∗ (a) 100.0 84.8 97.4
(b) 100.0 108.8 118.2
Carreras 134.6 100.0 108.9 150.4
Maddison 77.5 100.0 100.0 118.2 126.5
van Zanden (2005b) 106.4 100.0 97.0 89.3
van Zanden (2005a)
lower bound 100.0 90.7 85.4 100.0
upper bound 100.0 91.7 93.0 111.6
Panel B. Growth rates (%)
1530–91 1591–1700 1700–87 1787–1857 1530–1787 1591–1787 1530–1857
New estimates: Demand approach 0.11 −0.11 −0.02 0.30 −0.03 −0.07 0.04
Wrigley approach 0.27 −0.11 0.24 0.23 0.10 0.05 0.13
Yun-Casalilla∗∗∗∗ (a) −0.01
(b) 0.08
Carreras −0.30 0.08 0.32 0.04 0.20
Maddison 0.26 0.00 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.15
van Zanden (2005b) −0.09 −0.02 −0.08 −0.06 −0.05
van Zanden (2005a)
lower bound −0.10 0.08 0.00
upper bound −0.09 0.16 0.05
Sources: Yun-Casalilla (1994), Carreras (2003), Maddison (2003), van Zanden (2005a, 2005b) and Table 14.
Notes: ∗1500 for Carreras, van Zanden (2005b) and Maddison estimates.
∗∗1600 for Carreras, van Zanden (2005a) and Maddison. 1570 for van Zanden (2005b).
∗∗∗1800 for Carreras and van Zanden (2005b), and 1820 for Maddison and van Zanden (2005a).
∗∗∗∗Yun-Casalilla (1994).
(a) converted into grams of silver and deflated with Reher and Ballesteros (1993) consumer price index (in grams of silver).
(b) deflated with a composite consumer price index for 8 goods from Hamilton (1934) with weights from Vela and Marcos (1978).
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Figure 4. Real GDP per head in Europe: new estimates and van
Zanden’s (2005a) (UK in 1820= 100)
Sources: van Zanden (2005a) for all countries except Spain, from Table 13 (assuming
Spain’s real output per head in 1820 was equal to that of 1787).
in 1820 and 1850, respectively.71 Figure 4 offers our new estimates within van
Zanden’s (2005a) data set. We observe that Spain’s level was systematically
higher in our estimates than in van Zanden’s own computations. In fact,
during the sixteenth century Spain’s per capita income was above Britain’s
and Belgium’s and, by 1600, also above the ‘European’ average. The
evolution of Spain since the seventeenth century shadows at a lower level
that of Italy, while a north–south widening gap emerges in western Europe.
When the comparison is carried out with Maddison’s data set (Figure 5), our
new estimates show that in the early sixteenth century Spain’s income lagged
only behind Italy’s and, by 1600, only the Netherlands and Italy were ahead
of Spain. Hence, we can suggest that at the time of Charles V and Phillip II
Spain was a comparatively affluent nation, only second in per capita income
to the Low Countries and Italy. In the long run, however, Spain experienced
a sustained decline and fell behind not only the new leading nations (Britain
and the Netherlands) but western Europe altogether. Spanish recovery in the
first half of the nineteenth century – a significant achievement as it occurred
at the time of the loss of empire and a complex institutional transition to a
71 As we lacked evidence about Spain’s per capita GDP in 1820, we arbitrarily proxied it
with its level for 1787. In both data sets we accepted Spain’s level relative to the UK for
the benchmark year (1820 in van Zanden (2005a) and 1850 in Maddison (2003)) and
projected it back to 1500 with our index of real product per head.
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Figure 5. Real GDP per head in Europe: new estimates and Maddison’s
(2003) (UK in 1850= 100)
Sources: Maddison (2003) for all countries except Spain, from Table 13.
liberal society – fell short of the economic progress experienced in north-
western Europe during the first Industrial Revolution. Spain suffered, then,
the paradox of growing but falling behind.
4. Summary of findings
Available assessments of long-run performance in early modern Spain are
clearly on the low side as they suffer from two shortcomings: focusing on the
Kingdom of Castile and failing to include the contribution of non-agrarian
activities to GDP.
As an alternative, we analysed regional demographic trends and
urbanisation rates to capture trends in non-agrarian activities and in
other Spanish regions. Clear differences between inland and coastal
regions, indicating uneven rates of economic progress, come out. Rates of
urbanisation rose significantly in the 1500s, fell sharply in the seventeenth
century, and experienced a recovery since the early eighteenth century. By the
mid nineteenth century, a quarter of the Spanish population lived in urban
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settings compared with one-tenth in the early sixteenth century, according
to our adjusted urbanisation rates.
As urbanisation is associated with economic activity outside agriculture,
we combined its trends (adjusted to exclude those living off agriculture) with
those of agricultural output to reach aggregate output figures for more than
three centuries. Real product per head grew during the sixteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, suffered an absolute decline during the seventeenth
century and stagnated in the eighteenth century. On the whole, Spain hardly
experienced any growth in per capita income terms during the pre-industrial
era.
The contrast between per capita income trends in Spain and the main
western European countries suggests that sixteenth-century Spain was a
relatively affluent nation. When Spain’s long-run performance is examined
from a European perspective a sustained decline takes place. The mild
improvement of the sixteenth century was more than offset by the sharp
deterioration of the seventeenth century. Spanish relative backwardness
deepened during the first half of the nineteenth century.
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